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NOTES
Conclusion
There seems to be no doubt that the land trust can be a
valuable legal device in New York. The flexibility of its or-
ganization and the number of purposes for which it can be used
render it particularly useful to the creative attorney. Since the
beneficiary's interest is deemed personalty, partition will not lie
and a judgment against the beneficiary will not act as a lien on the
realty. Record title being in the trustee, the sale of jointly-owned
realty is greatly facilitated and the anonymity of the beneficiaries
may be preserved.
From the taxation standpoint, there is the consideration that
a skilled lawyer can so establish the land trust that it will have
fewer corporate than noncorporate characteristics and thus, burden-
some corporate taxation may be bypassed. The relative freedom
of organization when contrasted to the rigid compliance with
statutory norms demanded of corporations seems to be another
advantage over the corporate form.
The most serious legal roadblock to introduction of the land
trust in New York is the consideration that the duties imposed
on the trustee would seem to be insufficient to qualify it as an
active trust and, consequently,' the trust would be deemed
executed. It appears that statutory exemption from sections 92
and 93 is the most practicable solution to the problem of "dry"
trusts. Section 96 of the Real Property Law, as already indicated,
may also require legislative amendment although there is a pos-
sibility that the courts may be able to bring the land trust under
subdivision eight of that section.
In any event, the practical utility of the land trust as a legal
tool is beyond question. It would appear to be merely a matter
of time before its legal feasibility under New York law will be
put to the test.
M
FUNCTIONAL DIscouNTs- A THREAT TO COMPETITION?
The Robinson-Patman Act was established to insure com-
petitive equality by strengthening antitrust laws and by protecting
the businessman against unfair trade practices and unlawful price
discrimination.' To accomplish this result, section 2(a) of the
1 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). For a general
survey of the origin and legal impact of the Robinson-Patman Act, see
AusTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN-
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act prohibits direct or indirect discrimination in price by the seller
if its effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce or to injure, destroy
or prevent competition .... " 2 A respondent may refute a prima
facie illegal price discrimination by proving a cost justification
defense, i.e., that the price differential makes due allowance
only "for the differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered. . . ., 3
However, a functional discount, which is a discount granted by the
supplier as compensation to a buyer for performing distributive
services,4 is difficult to justify in this manner.5
This discount is usually granted by the suppliers to their
customers irrespective of the quantity purchased in any particular
transaction. At most, the discount reflects the suppliers' prospective
estimate "of the economic advantage of dealing with broad cus-
tomer classes performing characteristic marketing functions." 6
Functional discounts are customarily bestowed on a graduated basis
according to the buyer's respective place in the distribution chain.
For example, wholesalers or jobbers receive greater discounts than
retailers or dealers. So long as the group higher in the distributive
chain receives the larger discount, there generally is no adverse
effect on competition.7 But, with the advent of new marketing
techniques, it is not uncommon to find a large retailer performing
many wholesale functions (storage, insurance, assumption of credit
SON-PATMAN AcT. (2d rev. ed. 1959); Kintner, The Revitalized Federal
Trade Commission-A Two-Year Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1143, 1155-73(1952); Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year
Perspective, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 1059 (1957); Rowe, Price Discrimination
Competition and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J.
929 (1951).
2 49 Stat. 1522 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
3 Ibid. There are two other statutory defenses available: That the
seller's lower price was made in good faith to meet the price of a competitor,
or that the challenged differential was in "response to changing conditions
affecting the market . . . or the marketability of the goods concerned. .. ."
4 ATT'y GEN. NAT'L COmm. ANTITRUST REP. 202 (1955). It has been
suggested that a functional discount is the price differential granted to thebuyer because of the performance by the buyer of distributive functions
which give him greater bargaining power than that possessed by otherbuyers, whereas a trade discount is the price differential granted to a buyer
because of the classification of the buyer by the seller at a particular level
of distribution. Ibid.; Kelley, Functional Discount Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 40 CALIF. L. Rav. 526 (1952). However, since this subjectivedistinction has not been made by the FTC or the courts, this note will not
distinguish between trade and functional discounts.
5 EDWARDS, THE PRicE DISCRIMINATION LAw 313-17 (1959).6 ATTY' GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 203 (1955).




risks) or a wholesaler selling direct to consumers as well as to
retailers. This "proliferation of modern marketing units" obviously
creates legal complications in the functional discount area.8 For
instance, when the wholesaler is performing dual functions, should
he be legally entitled to receive a wholesale discount on the mer-
chandise sold directly to consumers? Likewise, should a wholesaler
who ordinarily resells only to "jobbers," 9 but who also resells
to retailers in competition with jobbers, be entitled to receive a
lower price than the jobber? In other words, should the discount
relate solely to a purchaser's position in the chain of distribution
or should due recognition be given also to the activities of a buyer
which, in one manner or another, benefit the suppplier. This note
will attempt to examine these questions in the light of the legislative
and judicial history of the act.
Historical Background
The traditional distribution chain, composed of supplier, whole-
saler, jobber and retailer, has been continuously challenged by less
orthodox and more dynamic marketing organizations.' 0  This
rivalry started in the post-World War I period with the rapid
growth of large chain stores and mail-order merchandisers."
These large organizations invested capital in facilities for performing
bulk storage, redelivery and financing, in order to integrate the
retailing and wholesaling functions within their organization. This
enabled them to deal directly with the manufacturer and to obtain
large price concessions. As might be expected, these occasionally
excessive discounts posed a great threat to conventional whole-
salers.
The Clayton Act of 1914 12 proved impotent to curb this
abuse.' 3 This act was originally interpreted to apply only to
oppressive or collusive pricing practices inimical to competition
among sellers.' 4 Not until 1929 did the Supreme Court validate the
application of the Clayton Act to situations involving price dis-
crimination by a seller which caused injury to competition among
8 ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 204 (1955).
9 "In the theoretical economic sense a jobber is a functionary in the
wholesaling process. He buys from the manufacturer, or from another whole-
saler who has bought from the manufacturer, and sells to the dealer. The
jobber's service is that of relieving the manufacturer, or in some instances the
wholesaler, from the necessity of direct contact with the dealer. . . ." United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F. Supp. 399, 481 (D.D.C. 1946).
10 RowE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 4.
11 Comment, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 659, 661 (1956).
12 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
13 RowE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 6-7.
14 See, e.g., National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 733, 739 (2d Cir.
1924); Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1923).
1962 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
his customers. 15  This change was of little significance since
unlimited price differentials were allowed by the courts in the
form of quantity discounts regardless of cost or competitive con-
siderations.16  By 1922 it appeared that a continuation of un-
restrained competition between the chain stores and independent
retailers might well result in the elimination of the latter from
the marketplace. Hopefully, the traditional distributors called upon
their state legislatures to enact curative legislation. State anti-
trust laws were amended so as to apply more directly to corporate
chains, 17 and tax revisions enacted to deter the operation of a
large number of stores by any one company.' 8
These efforts by the states proved to be inadequate, and with
the worsening of economic conditions in the early 1930's and the
continued growth of mass distributors, congressional attention was
focused upon the problem. The Codes of Fair Competition author-
ized by the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 19 were an
attempt, in many cases, by independent merchants to enact the
orthodox patterns of distribution into law.20  For example, some
codes classified chain distributors and mail-order houses as retailers,
thus barring them from obtaining a wholesale discount even
though they performed the typical wholesale function. However,
even before the N.R.A. was declared unconstitutional, 21 the codes
were hopelessly in confusion and ineffective due to public apathy
and organized resistance by mass distributors.2 2  Within this
context, Congress passed the 1936 Robinson-Patman amendments
to the Clayton Act 23 as a second attempt to "curb and prohibit
all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences
over small ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power." 24
Considerable congressional attention was given to the question of
functional discounts prior to passage of these amendments.
15 George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245
(1929).
16 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620, 623 (6th Cir.
1939). Although the court's decision permitting unlimited quantity discounts
did not come until 1939, that interpretation was anticipated in the 1935 hearing
on the Robinson-Patman proposals. See RowE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 7-8
n.15.
17 FTC, Final Report of Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 82-84 (1934).
18 BLOOMFIELD, CHAIN STORES AND LEGISLATION 108 (1939); Legislation
80 U. PA. L. REv. 289 (1931); Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 314 (1935).
19 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
20 RowE, PaIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
10 (1962). For a study of these code provisions, see ZORN & FELDMAN
BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PUCE LAWS 28-30 (1937).
21 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
22 RowE, op. cit. szpra note 20, at 10-11.
2338 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S C. §§ 12-27 (1958).
24 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166. 168 (1960).
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Legislative History of Functional Prices
In 1935 legislation was introduced in both the House and
Senate to amend Section 2 of the Clayton Act. The Robinson
Bill that passed the Senate permitted price differentials based solely
on the purchaser's position within the distributive hierarchy. 25
Thus, a wholesaler who bought the same amount of merchandise
from the supplier as a direct-buying retailer would be allowed
a larger discount solely because he was a wholesaler. In the
House, the Patman Bill, as reported out of committee, had an
added provision that clearly specified that "the character of the
selling of the purchaser and not the buying shall determine the
classification . . . ." of customers capable of legally receiving
functional discounts. Furthermore, the bill classified any purchaser
who "does both a wholesale and retail business . . . (1) as a
wholesaler on purchases for sale to retail dealers only, ...
and (2) as a retailer on purchases for sale to consumers."' 26
The report by the House Judiciary Committee indicated that these
provisions were necessary in order to prevent "unwarranted dis-
turbance of existing habits of trade." 27 However, the agricultural
purchasing cooperatives, fearful that these provisions would require
them to pay the same prices as other retailers, exerted pressure
for the removal of these provisions.2- Whether as a result of this
pressure, or other political considerations, both the Senate and
House provisions on functional discounts were omitted from the
final bill. Unfortunately, neither the conference reports nor sub-
sequent discussions by Congress indicated the reason for the
deletion.
It is arguable then that Congress thought a difference in price
between the traditional functional classes was so ingrained in the
business world that it was not necessary to protect the price
difference by specifically exempting it from the ambit of the
legislation. Also it could be maintained that Congress believed
that the absence of competition between functional classes would
prevent a price discrimination from having any injurious effect
it might otherwise have on competition. On the other hand,
Congress might have intended functional discounts to undergo
the same test of legality regarding injury and cost justifications
as is applied to other price discriminations.29 The answers to the
25 S. 3154, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936).
26 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1936).
27H.t. Rin'. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1936).
28 EDWARDS, THE PRicE DIscRImxNATIoN LAW 286 (1959); See Bar-
tenstein, F uctional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 4 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 121, 122 n.6 (1947).
29 EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 28, at 287.
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problems were left entirely to the Federal Trade Commission and
to the courts.
Legal Status of Functional Discounts
Soon after the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Com-
mission in effect reinstated the deleted portions of the House and
Senate bills. The Commission, after approving a classification of
customers based on the character of the selling of the customer,
decided that a jobber's discount could not be granted to a dual-
distributor jobber-a jobber who sells both at wholesale and at
retail-for those goods which he would resell directly to the
consumer.30  However, the discount could be granted on those
goods resold to retailers. The FTC was of the opinion that the
jobber receiving the greater functional discount could resell to
consumers at lower prices than a direct-buying retailer who
received a smaller discount, thus resulting in an injury to com-
petition. Evidently, the fact that the wholesale-retail venture
of the jobber required a capital investment over and above that
of the direct-buying retailer was not thought to be of any relevancy.
Moreover, the fact that the dual-distributor jobber might perform
services for the supplier which were related to the entire amount
of goods purchased and not merely to those to be resold to
retailers was not given consideration. Subsequent adjudications
not only reaffirmed the principle that the purchaser's resale activity
determines his eligibility for a functional discount, but also com-
pelled the seller to secure reasonable assurance from its customers
as to the ultimate destination of the goods.31 This was to ensure
that the customers were properly classified within the discount
structure.
It had been generally felt that the single-function middle-
man presented no problem of classification, for he bought as well
as sold in one distributive role, i.e., as a wholesaler or a
retailer.3 2  Since the eligibility for the functional discount was
based on the buyer's selling activity, this type of discount would
seem entirely lawful. However, in 1945, the FTC's Standard Oil
opinion raised some doubt even about this legality.33 Standard Oil,
a dual marketer, selling its gasoline through jobbers as well as
30 Albert L. Whiting, 26 F.T.C. 312, 318 (1938) ; Agricultural Laboratories,
Inc., 26 F.T.C. 296 (1938); Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938);
Nitragin Co., 26 F.T.C. 320, 326 (1938).
31 See Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25, 64-65 (1943).
32 The supplier's customers who were retailers were not considered to be
competing with the "pure" wholesalers.
33 Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), aff'd, Standard Oil Co. v.




directly to retail service stations, had granted to several jobbers
buying in tank-car lots at Standard's bulk plant, a 12 cent
discount from the price paid by retailers who took delivery at
their premises in smaller tank-wagon lots. All of the jobbers
who received the discount utilized their own equipment for storage
and transportation from the bulk plant to service stations. Some
of these jobbers resold the gasoline to independently-owned retail
service stations which were in competition with the retailers pur-
chasing directly from Standard. Standard's discount to the jobbers
permitted those jobbers to sell to their customers at a price lower
than that at which Standard was selling to its direct-buying retailers-
thus placing the latter at a competitive disadvantage. 34  According
to the FTC, this was enough to establish the statutory injury
to competition. Therefore the Commission issued an order pre-
cluding the supplier from granting any discount on gasoline sold
to jobbers in cases where jobbers saw fit to sell to their retail
customers at a price below that offered by Standard.35  Sub-
sequently, the Court of Appeals modified the order by conditioning
liability on the reasonable knowledge of Standard that its jobbers
were undercutting Standard's price in the sale of gasoline to its
retailers.36  It would seem that the Commissioner's order in
Standard Oil would require a supplier to control the resale prices
of his independent distributors. This result has been criticized
by many legal authorities as contradicting the basic antitrust policy
of fostering a free competitive economy.
37
Besides this objection, the overall policy followed by the FTC
seemed to discourage the supplier from using various distributive
channels, thereby thwarting competition and efficiency in marketing
and inevitably leading to higher consumer prices.38 Legal com-
plications were likely to arise if the supplier distributed his product
at a discount to his dual distributors while not granting it to his
customers who were independent retailers.39  Similarly, if the
supplier decided to sell to single function middlemen at a discount
while selling to direct-buying retailers at the regular price, he
would be subject to the type of restrictions imposed in the Standard
Oil decision. 40  Consequently, possible litigation could be avoided
only by selecting one type of customer (either retailers, or whole-
34 Id. at 276.
35 Id. at 285.
36 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on
other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
37 Arr'y GEN. NAr'L CoiM. ANTTRUST RE,. 206, 207 (1955). See, e.g.,
Bartenstein, Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 4 WAsH.
& LEE L. Rwv. 121, 137-38 (1947); Kelley, Functional Discounts Under the
Robbtson-Patinan Act, 40 CA.TF. L. REv. 526, 544 (1952).
38 EDVARDs, op. cit. supra note 28, at 345.
39 See notes 30 & 31 spra.
40 See note 33 supra.
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sale-retailers, or "pure" wholesalers),41 or by adopting a uniform
pricing system for all class of customers. 42  The latter method
is not subject to the regulations of the act because a price dis-
crimination has been interpreted to mean a price difference. 43
Thus, it seemed the net economic effect of the FTC's policy was
to stifle the stimulus to vigorous competition that would result
from the use of different channels of distribution.
The report of the Attorney General's National Committee took
issue with the fairness of a policy which maintained that a functional
discount must relate to the purchaser's resale activity. 44  The
Committee stated:
[T]o relate discounts or prices solely to the purchaser's resale activities
without recognition of his buying functions . . . compels affirmative dis-
crimination against a substantial class of distributors, and hence serves as a
penalty on integration. If a businessman actually fulfills the wholesale
function by relieving his suppliers of risk, storage, transportation, admin-
istration, etc., his performance, his capital investment, and the saving to
his suppliers are unaffected by whether he also performs the retailing
function, or any number of other functions. A legal rule disqualifying
him from discounts recognizing wholesaling functions actually performed
compels him to render these functions free of charge. The value of the
service is pocketed by the seller who did not earn i0 5
Furthermore, the Committee asserted that if a differential accords
41 E.g., Bird & Son, 25 F.T.C 548 (1937). Here the FTC stated:
"the Act does not purport to interfere with the right of the seller to select
his customers. He may discriminate in the choice of the customers. Not
until there is a discrimination in price among those chosen does Section 2(a)
of the Act have any application." Id. at 553.
42 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960). According to the
Court's summation: "when this Court has spoken of price discrimination in
§ 2(a) cases, it has generally assumed that the term was synonymous with
price differentiation." Id. at 549. Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co.,
187 F. Supp. 345, 353-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Bird & Son, 25 F.T.C 548, 553
(1937).
43 Ibid. Referring to this policy, the court commented in Klein v. Lionel
Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del.), aff'd, 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956)
that a uniform price quoted to both retail and wholesale distributors would
"accomplish precisely that which the Act was intended to prevent, viz.,
a discrimination in price between two purchasers from the same seller."
Id. at 565. Consequently, there have been congressional proposals to expand
the definition of discrimination so as to require the supplier to grant greater
price differentials to wholesalers than to retailers, regardless of the marketing
function performed. E.g., H.R. 3465, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; S. 315.
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). However, the FTC and the Justice Department
have maintained that these bills are incompatible with broad antitrust ob-
jectives, since it projects the seller into the cost and price relationships
of independent distributors when he is determining what the legally required
differential should be. RowE, PRICE DiSCRItiNATION UNDER THE RoBINSON-




merely due recognition and reimbursement for actual marketing
functions an injury to the buyer's competitors could not be "the
effect" of the differential. 46 As long as the amount of the discount
is reasonably related to the expenses assumed by the buyer it
would be fully absorbed by the buyer and could not have the
requisite causal effect on competition. Thus, the supplier should
not be held responsible for his customer's price cutting.47  In
effect, this approach would allow a functional discount to those
buyers who performed identical services in terms of distribution
of the sellers product as the traditional distributors. The fact
that the dual distributor is selling in competition with groups
not receiving the discount, such as independent retailers, would
not be relevant.
It should be noted that in practice the recommendation of
the Committee would prove to be difficult to administer. The
buyer would only be entitled to a discount for the services he
actually performs on that part of the goods for which he performs
it. Thus, it must be determined in each case exactly what part
of the wholesaling functions a given distributor performs. Then,
the figure must be applied to that portion of the goods purchased
for which the distributor actually performs wholesale functions.
In addition to these administrative difficulties, this procedure
changes the nature of the functional discount from one granted
to a class of distributors to a discount granted on an individual
basis. This approaches a theory which would demand a cost
justification under section 2(a) for all functional discounts.
Nevertheless, the ideas expressed in the Attorney General's
Report were temporarily accepted by the FTC in its Doubleday
opinion.48  In that case the supplier attempted to justify a greater
discount given to one of three competing groups by classifying the
discounts as compensation for services and facilities furnished by
the favored group. By admitting this evidence, the FTC over-
ruled the hearing examiner's adjudication that it is only the
seller's costs, not the buyer's, which may be used defensively
under the law itself.49 The opinion noted that the performance
by a distributor of various wholesale functions, such as providing
storage, traveling salesmen, and distribution of catalogues, could be
compensated for by the supplier, so long as the size of the discount
was "reasonably related to the expenses assumed by the buyer." 50
46 Id. at 208.
47 RowE, op. cit. supra note 43, at 192.
48 Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. 169 (1955).
49 Id. at 169 n.7. Since no attempt had been made by the seller to correlate
the alleged payments for services with actual performance, the evidence was
considered insufficient to demonstrate the required reasonable relationship be-
tween the discount and services rendered.
5O Id. at 209. Two commissioners who concurred with the majority did
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As long as the amount of the discount corresponds with
the cost of the function assumed by the distributor, it will be
absorbed by the buyer, and, consequently, cannot be the cause of
any injury to competition. Under this interpretation of the
Doubleday opinion, a proper discount could never result in an
injury to competition.51 In addition, as subsequently indicated in
the Mueller decision, it is possible to interpret Doubleday as holding
that a price differential granted as compensation for services
performed is permissible regardless of the ultimate injury to com-
petition.52 This latter interpretation would add a defense to a
prima facie violation of section 2(a) which is not included in the
statute.53  However, it is unlikely that this is what the commission
intended in its Doubleday decision, since the opinion noted that a
functional discount was safe under the act only if it created no
competitive injury.54
The Doubleday doctrine was cast into doubt by the Con-
mission's General Foods ruling in 1956."5 The supplier in that
case had granted lower prices to its Institution Contract Wagon
Distributors than to its conventional wholesalers. In return, these
distributors agreed to perform a multitude of merchandising ac-
tivities that none of the conventional wholesalers undertook. 56 Not
following the Doubleday rationale, the examiner excluded proof of
the cost of various services that the Institution Contract Wagon
Distributors had performed. 57 Since the services were rendered
in connection with the resale of merchandise that was now owned
by the wholesaler, the examiner maintained that the supplier was
actually paying the distributors for doing their own work. The"
examiner realized that the performance of these services benefited
the supplier, but he felt that the wagon distributor was the primary
beneficiary. Thus, the distributor's greater business cost could
not be accepted as justification for a price differential.
Referring to this situation, the examiner commented:
This is exactly what the law says cannot be done. Otherwise respondent
not feel that a change in the law was appropriate. Id. at 211 and 212
(concurring opinions).
51 RowE, op. cit. szpra note 43, at 192.
52 Mueller Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 15686 at 20519 (FTC Jan. 12,
1962).
53 Ibid.
54 Doubleday & Co., szpra note 48, at 207.
55 General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).56 The contract required the distributor to arrange for distribution and
use of promotional material, handle damaged merchandise, maintain adequate
stock, arrange for appropriate displays, move older stock first, provide delivery
to dealers, maintain replacement parts for coffee-making equipment, and use
its best efforts to promote General Foods. Id. at 802.
57 Id. at 809-10.
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[the supplier] could appraise the cost of doing business of its customers,
evaluate their efforts and efficiencies, subsidize their deficiencies, and have
a different selling price for each-an end which the law was designed
to prevent.5s
Furthermore, when the supplier alleged that the Institution Con-
tract Wagon Distributors were a functionally distinct group, the
Commission indorsed, without mentioning Doubleday, the earlier
rule which disapproved of a functional classification that granted
different prices to competing sellers.59 Thereafter, the Commission
concluded that the supplier could only pay for "services and
facilities furnished" in the resale of goods if he complied with
section 2(d) of the act.60  This section requires the seller to make
sure that payments given to his favored distributors are also avail-
able "on proportionately equal terms to all other customers com-
peting in the distribution of such products or commodities." 61
Having sanctioned the applicability of this section, the opinion then
held that it did not apply to distributive functions which are
incapable of proportionalization or "having a price or tag put on
it." 62
This utilization of section 2(d) in the functional discount
area was not generally anticipated. 63  In the first place, the
purpose of that section was to prohibit the discriminatory practices
by which advertising allowances were employed by sellers to
bring about price discrimination.' Accordingly, the section was
not ordinarily considered applicable to cases where the supplier,
581d. at 810.
50 Id. at 824.
60 Id. at 825.
61 49 Stat. 1522 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1958). It should be noted
that in order for this provision to apply the supplier must have actually sold
the goods to the distributor. Moreover, the payment must be made in
connection with the resale of the goods so bought. Accordingly, the section
does not apply where the supplier through his own salesmen sells directly
to a particular customer, but arranges to have the distributors select goods
from their own stock and make delivery of the goods to the customer. Any
payment compensating the distributor for the services performed are, there-
fore, not restricted under § 2(d). Furthermore, no price discrimination
under § 2(a) will arise unless the reimbursement is "grossly in excess of the
cost or value of services rendered." General Foods Corp., supra note 55,
at 828.
62 General Foods Corp., supra note 55, at 823-25.
63 See RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
191 (1962).
64 Typical arrangements that come under the scrutiny of § 2(d)
involve payment by the supplier to selected customers for advertising the seller's
product. See, e.g., Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89 (1954). The
only reason the words "service or facilities" rather than "advertising allow-
ance" were employed was to prevent evasion. Southgate Brokerage Co. v.
FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 611 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945).
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as in General Foods, gave a greater discount to distributors equipped
to cultivate an institutional market by carrying stocks and furnish-
ing various extra promotional services. In addition, the legal
standards of 2(d) are considered more severe than the standards
applicable to 2(a). For example, section 2(d) applies irrespective
of any adverse impact on competition. Furthermore, a prima
facie unlawful arrangement cannot be justified through the em-
ployment of defenses available to validate a price discrimination
subject to the prohibitions of section 2(a). 65 Thus, the FTC
and the courts have traditionally confined this section to its
legislative contemplated province.
Since General Foods did not mention Doubleday, some writers
have suggested that it is not inconsistent with the latter opinion.66
Emphasis was placed on the nature of the arrangement between
the suppliers and the respective buyers.67 For instance, in General
Foods, unlike Doubleday, the Institution Contract Wagon Dis-
tributors group received the greater discount for contracting to sell
in a particular manner rather than for the actual performance of
specific services.68 Under these circumstances the functional dis-
count was not related to the actual services performed. Also,
since General Foods involved a new method of distribution, it-
was suggested that the FTC was applying a stricter standard
than it would apply to a more traditional type distributor as was
the case in Doubleday.6 9  Significantly, the subsequent Mueller
decision did not accept these distinctions.70
The FTC's Mueller ruling resolved in the negative the issue
of whether or not a greater discount granted to specific dis-
tributors rendering very definite, substantial and valuable services
which otherwise would have to be performed by the seller at a
cost exceeding or equalling that of the distributor.7 1  Rejecting
the Doubleday doctrine that no competitive injury was possible
in such circumstances, the Commission emphasized that this doctrine
"ignores the fact that the favored buyer can derive substantial
benefit to his own business in performing the distributional function
paid for bv the seller." 72 In this case, the larger discount was
given to the favored distributors for the warehousing of certain
65 ROWE, op. cit. supra note 63, at 364.
66 Note, 66 YALE L.J. 243, 256 (1956); see Comment, 54 MicH. L. REv.
659, 678 n.75a (1956).67 See Note, supra note 66, at 249-50: Comment, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 659, 678
n.75a (1956).
68 Ib:d.
69 See Note, supra note 66, at 249-50 (1956).
70 In Mueller the FTC specifically stated that General Foods had in effect
overrtu!ed Doubleday. Mueller Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 15686 at
20520 (FTC Jan. 12, 1962).:
71 Mueller Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 15686 (FTC Jan. 12, 1962).72 Id. at 20520.
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products commonly employed by the ultimate users, often to meet
an emergency. Accordingly, the selected distributors, having the
product readily available, were in a better position than their
competitors. 73 Relying on the General Foods opinion, the supplier
then alleged that section 2(d) applied irrespective of injury.74
Since the arrangement was not available on proportionately equal
terms to all of the competing customers, the FTC did not decide
whether 2(d) was applicable.7 5  However, since this opinion
approved of the use of 2(d) in General Foods, it would seem that
despite competitive injury a discount would be permissible if it
satisfied the 2(d) requirements.7 6
Once again, the predominate test relates to the purchaser's
resale activity. But, the possibility of incorporating the 2(d)
requirements into a situation like that presented in Mueller might
very well be a satisfactory solution to a difficult problem. As
long as the FTC finds an injury to competition before requiring
the seller to prove proportional equal treatment, this would seem
not to unduly interfere with the free competitive process. But,
if the Commission applied 2(d) prior to applying 2(a), a functional
discount could be declared unlawful, even though there was no
competitive injury. Which of the alternatives will finally be
accepted by the FTC must depend on future decisions.
Conclusion
It has been stated that progress in distribution has lagged
behind progress in manufacturing, that the distributive methods
are often wasteful, and that the opportunities to improve the
efficiency of distribution are substantial. That being the case, it
would seem that a policy encouraging experiment with distributive
methods should be pursued. No doubt, experimentation would
result in some harm to particular classes of distributors. However,
considering the total effect, a change in distributive methods would,
just as likely, increase or leave unchanged the dynamic quality of
the competitive forces that mold the market.77 Accordingly, since
the present system is not considered very efficient, a strict rule
dedicated to preserving the status quo, as exemplified by the pre-
Doubleday approach, does not seem beneficial.
73 Ibid.
74 Id. at 20521.
75 Ibid.
7 6 Id. at 20520; see RowE, PRICE DISCRIBnNATIo UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT 191-92 (1962).7 7 EDWARDs, THE PRiCE DISCRI INATION LAW 344-45 (1959); see Note,
66 YALE L.J. 243 n.1 (1956).
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On the other hand, it is clear that functional classification
can be used as a device for discrimination which is injurious to
competition thereby unfairly handicapping particular distributors.
Consequently, whether the injury is deemed to be the result of a
price discrimination or the result of the discriminatory selection
by the seller of a favored buyer to perform specific services is not
important to the affected buyers. The harm is real.
Therefore, what is needed is a rule that does not unduly
prohibit experiment, or unfairly injure a particular class of
distributors. As previously suggested by the Mueller opinion, if
the injury results from a discount that is reasonably related to the
expenses assumed by the buyer, the discount should not be illegal
if all competing purchasers were offered proportionately equal treat-
ment. The rule has the advantage of encouraging change while
preventing discriminatory selection by the seller. Thus, it fosters
competition in the distributive process without any substantial
lessening of protection accorded to the buyers.
